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ABSTRACT 
Procurement and activation of resources from distribution 
network for ancillary services will require new grid 
organisation for ensuring and improving interaction 
between TSOs and DSOs. EU H2020 project SmartNet 
proposes five different architectures or coordination 
schemes (CSs) that each present a different way of 
organizing this interaction with a specific set of roles taken 
by the system operators and detailed market design. The 
study made a comparative evaluation of these CSs based 
on realistic scenarios for 2030 and implemented in 
simulations. The following study made a comprehensive 
screening of more than 40 documents based on a selection 
of key topics, which are essential for SmartNet and 
evaluated how the CSs are aligned with the present 
national and European policy goals and positions of the 
key industrial stakeholders. The screening was structured 
according to a set of so-called topics of interest, which the 
project considers to be essential for definition of well-
functioning TSO-DSO interaction. 
The general conclusion of the study is neither the main 
hypothesis nor the suggested CSs directly conflict with 
terms of the EU regulation. However, the regulation does 
not address several topics, which are crucial for large 
scale utilisation of Distributed Energy Resources in 
ancillary services. Without common EU regulations 
different solutions will develop in the distribution areas, 
the most diverse and non-harmonized solutions will be 
implemented in agreement between DSOs and adjoining 
TSO (e.g. nation- or region-wise under influence of TSO). 
This will not necessarily hamper the utilisation of local 
flexibility in the transmission grids, but it will certainly 
make more difficult the development towards cross-border 
utilisation of distributed energy resources. 
INTRODUCTION 
The increasing share of intermittent renewable energy 
sources (RES) in the European electricity grid results in 
higher need for flexibility resources providing ancillary 
services (AS) to compensate for the power fluctuations. 
The DER units feeding into the distribution grids provide 
an additional opportunity for system operators to use these 
resources for services such as frequency control, voltage 
control and congestion management both at the 
distribution and transmission level. This will, however, 
require a radically new architecture for ensuring and 
improving the interaction between TSOs and DSOs. This 
necessity has been recognized by several Pan-European 
legislative acts and documents as Network Guidelines and 
Directive on common rules for the internal market in 
electricity [4]. The process however is still under 
development, making it necessary to consider alignment of 
the future architectures with the present and coming 
regulatory acts.   
 
The present paper is based on results of EU H2020 project 
SmartNet [7] (2016-2019), which aims at providing 
architectures or so-called coordination schemes for 
optimized interaction between TSOs and DSOs in 
managing the exchange of information for monitoring and 
for the acquisition of ancillary services (reserve and 
balancing, voltage regulation, congestion management) 
both at national level and in a cross-border context. 
SMARTNET COORDINATION SCHEMES 
SmartNet proposes five different architectures or 
coordination schemes (CSs) that each present a different 
way of organizing the coordination between transmission 
and distribution system operators (TSOs and DSOs), when 
distributed resources (production, storage or demand) are 
used for ancillary services (for details, see [2] and [3]). 
Each coordination scheme is characterized by a specific set 
of roles, taken up by system operators and a detailed 
market design. 
 
• Centralized AS market model (CS_A), where the TSO 
operates a market for both resources connected at 
transmission and distribution level, without 
involvement of the DSO. 
• Local AS market model (CS_B), where the DSO 
organizes a local market for resources connected at the 
DSO-grid and, after solved local grid constraints, 
offers the remaining bids to the TSO. 
• Shared balancing responsibility model (CS_C), where 
balancing responsibilities are divided between TSO 
and DSO according to a predefined schedule. The 
DSO organizes a local market to respect the schedule 
agreed with the TSO while the TSO has no access to 
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resources connected at the distribution grid. 
• Common TSO-DSO AS market model (CS_D), where 
the TSO and the DSO have a common objective to 
decrease costs to satisfy both the need for resources 
by the TSO and the DSO. This common objective 
could be realized by the joint operation of a common 
market (centralized variant) of the dynamic 
integration of a local market, operated by the DSO, 
and a central market, operated by the TSO 
(decentralized variant). 
• Integrated flexibility market model (CS_E), where the 
market is open for both regulated and non- regulated 
market parties, which requires the introduction of an 
independent market operator to guarantee neutrality. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE COORDINATION 
SCHEMES 
During the course of the project a comparative evaluation 
of the CSs has been done. Each coordination scheme 
involves a different market architecture. To make the 
results in terms of costs and benefits comparable, realistic 
scenarios for the 2030 horizon have been defined for the 
different countries where the schemes are going to be 
tested: Italy, Denmark and Spain.  
 
From the simulation results the cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) will draw conclusions concerning the best 
coordination scheme. To help analysis or system and 
markets operation under each of the five CSs, a large-scale 
simulator, has been developed to realistically model the 
behaviour of complex systems which include transmission 
and distribution networks, bidding and market processes, 
as well as fundamental physics behind each flexible device 
connected to the system. This simulator comprises three 
different perspectives (layers): market, 
bidding/dispatching and physical layer. The market layer 
receives the bids (from the bidding layer) and optimizes 
the activations in the system taking into account the 
transmission and distribution grid topologies and 
constraints (included in the physical layer).  
 
With all the data needed by the simulation platform the 
simulations have been carried out for the different 
coordination schemes. It has to be highlighted that in the 
CBA analysis, scheme Integrated flexibility market 
(CS_E) has not been tested due to its complexity and 
scheme Common TSO-DSO market (CS_D) has been split 
into two: CS_D1, a centralized market with the 
optimization calculated in a single step and CS_D2, where 
a decentralized market is considered, where a local optima 
is found for the DSO, and the TSO finds a compatible 
solution to meet its needs.   
 
Based on the simulation results, the CBA has been done 
using a two-step methodology:  
1. System-level CBA build of ad-hoc defined indicators 
that evaluate the impact of each coordination scheme 
over the costs of the power grid. 
2. Profitability analysis: to evaluate the benefits and 
allocate the costs derived from the schemes to the 
different stakeholders in the value chain. 
 
As the goal of the CBA analysis is to quantify the 
benefits/costs of the different coordination schemes, the 
definition of certain indicators, then can be easily 
monetized is required. This way, the total cost in any 
country for every coordination scheme is the sum of the 
evaluated indicators.  
 
Four indicators have been selected: 
1. System balancing cost as result of the ancillary 
services market. 
2. Cost of the additional actions taken by the network 
operators after the manual Frequency Restoration 
Reserves (FRR) market clearing. 
3. System balancing costs after the gate closure of mFRR 
market (also called automatic Frequency Restoration 
Reserves market - aFRR). 
4. Costs of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) deployment 
 
The emissions of CO2 are also an indicator of the CBA. 
However, as this cost has been already included as a 
component of the submitted bids, they have not been 
considered as an extra indicator to be added to the four 
previously mentioned. By way of example, the results 
corresponding to the evaluation of the system balancing 
costs in the mFRR market after the aFRR market for the 
Italian case are shown in Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1 Results of evaluation of indicators 1, 3 and 4 for the 
Italian case 
From the evaluation of the indicators for the Italian case 
can be seen that CS_D1 is more economically profitable 
than the remaining schemes. However, CS_A has lower 
ICT costs and CS_C manages a large amount of energy due 
to the simplifications of the network model that are used in 
the clearing algorithm.  
 
Further analysis of the Italian case as well as the evaluation 
of the Danish and Spanish cases is shown in [6]. 
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THE SCREENING STUDY 
The above-mentioned assessment of the coordination 
schemes provides an indication of the overall feasibility 
allowing to identify the most viable alternatives. In order 
to put the outcomes of the project in real time context it is 
also necessary to consider how the SmartNet's 
coordination schemes align with the regulatory 
framework, which has already been implemented or/and 
has been suggested for the implementation within a certain 
number of years. For this purpose, a comprehensive 
screening of legislative and regulatory documents has been 
done. In addition, the study considered stakeholders' 
views, which may show whether the given stakeholders 
may accept and even endorse SmartNet's outcomes and 
how challenging it may be to replicate these across Europe. 
 
Organisation of the screening  
The documents considered in this study have been issued 
by several types of stakeholders, including: 
• Governmental Organisations e.g. The European 
Commission (EC) 
• Organisations working with different aspects of 
Regulation and Standardisation (National Regulation 
Authorities (NRAs), Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER), European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
(ENTSO-E) and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) 
• Interest organisations as Industrial Associations and 
similar (European Distribution System Operators' 
Association (EDSO) for Smart Grids for Smart Grids, 
WindEurope etc.) 
• Other e.g. European Technology & Innovation 
Platform - Smart Networks for Energy Transition 
(ETIP-SNET) 
The study evaluated all together more than 40 documents, 
including Pan-European and national legislation, strategic 
documents, position papers and roadmaps (for the full list 
of documents see [1]). 
 
The screening was structured according to a set of so-
called topics of interest, which the project considers to be 
essential for definition of well-functioning TSO-DSO 
interaction. These topics in general reflect some of the key 
assumptions and choices, which were done in the project 
prior to development of the coordination schemes. These 
components have in many ways influenced configuration 
of the project's final outcomes. 
• Market sessions timeline 
• Nodal market vs. zonal   
• Local congestion management by DSOs vs 
centralized TSO market 
• Prequalification of resources in distribution networks 
• Inclusion of constraints (device-related) from 
distribution grid bidders 
• Operation of possible local market 
• Management of voltage constraints 
• Availability of reserve capacity 
• Relationship with previous markets 
• Pay-as-bid vs. pay-as-clear 
• Optimisation criterion for electricity market design – 
maximization of social welfare vs. minimum 
activation costs 
• Roles and Responsibilities in the context of the 
prequalification, procurement, activation and 
settlement of AS markets including observability 
• Ancillary services considered in the screened 
documents 
• Possibility to create “virtual” copperplate bids vs 
nodal bidding 
• Possibility for bidding negative prices in ancillary 
service (AS) markets 
• Dimensioning of bidding zones 
• Incentivisation mechanisms for RES vs price 
revelation in AS Market 
• Minimum bid size and resolution 
• Prioritisation of control traffic (support for network 
slicing) - how prioritisation for ICT control traffic for 
energy system management is ensured so to guarantee 
secure system operation. 
• Responsibilities and ownership of components and 
data 
• Energy supply for communication and ICT 
components (how to ensure sufficient power backup 
for ICT) 
• Remote controllability of DER 
The limitations of the present paper do not allow to present 
these in detail, while the description is available in [1].  
 
Summary of the findings from the screening 
This section summarises the most representative results 
from the screening of EU legislation, which is relevant for 
topics of interest identified in the SmartNet project and 
described above. 
 
Local congestion management by DSOs vs centralized 
TSO market 
In the issue related to priority of doing local congestion 
management by DSO vs centralized TSO market: neither 
the EC nor the CEER do express any clear position about 
market solutions. There are, however, several clear 
preferences from the stakeholders. It appears that 
mechanisms for the procurement of flexibility (either via 
common procurement or via market at each grid level) and 
the framework (since DSOs are regulated entities) for the 
recognition of costs is still missing.  
 
Prequalification of resources in distribution networks 
The screening indicates two main topics of the discussion:  
• Which actor (-s)/role (-s) should be involved into the 
pre-qualification process i.e. TSO, DSO individually 
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or in coordinated manner or aggregator 
• What should be the qualification level i.e. individual 
or portfolio.  
Recast of the Regulation of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the internal market for electricity makes a 
general definition of prequalification. It also stipulates that 
the procurement shall be organised in a non-discriminatory 
way between market participants in the prequalification 
process, either individually or through aggregation. 
Guideline on electricity defines that each balancing service 
provider intending to provide service, should pass the 
qualification process defined by TSO and if necessary, by 
DSO. 
 
Operation of possible local market (single DSO vs 
common distribution Market Operator) 
The recast of the Directive on common rules for the 
internal market in electricity only advocates that 
regulatory framework in the Member States should give 
incentives to DSOs to use flexibility services to improve 
operational efficiency and distribution network 
development, e.g. congestion management at distribution 
level. The same document also recommend that DSOs 
shall procure flexibility services via market-based 
solutions.  
 
Relationship with previous markets including Gate 
Closure Times (GCTs) 
The only requirement for this in present legislative 
documents is that the participants in the balancing markets 
shall be allowed to bid as close to real-time as possible and 
at last after the intraday gate closure. 
 
Possibility to create "virtual" copperplate bids versus 
nodal bidding  
The regulation focuses on correct local price signals and 
transparency in the process of determining the locational 
signal. The review did not identify any legislation about 
copperplate versus nodal bidding. 
 
Definition of bidding products 
The legislative acts do not require but open the possibility 
to develop complex bids.  
 
Minimum bid size and resolution 
Currently, in practice the size of minimum bid is between 
5-10MW, but a movement towards smaller balancing 
products (1 MW for mFRR vs currently typically 5MW) 
can be expected 
 
Incentivisation mechanism for RES vs price revelation 
While in most national markets there are legacy 
Incentivisation mechanisms for RES, there is longer term 
strategy to apply this only to smaller installation or less 
mature technologies. It is argued that larger installations of 
mature technologies should participate in the markets and 
phasing out of their subsidies is planned by 2030. 
 
Prioritisation of control traffic 
The SmartNet concept requires that the control signals are 
always very reliable transmitted to the Distributed Energy 
Resource in less than 0.5-1 minute. There is no regulation 
ensuring this requirement. The regulation is the other way 
around: traffic management need to allow low latency 
transmission of small real time control signals will be 
allowed as long as it does not reduce the quality of normal 
internet access of the end users. 
 
Responsibility and ownership of components and data 
The recast electricity Directive states that “eligible parties” 
(defined as customers, suppliers, TSOs and DSOs, 
aggregators, energy service companies etc) may have 
access to data of the final customer with their explicit 
consent. The review did not identify any legislation about 
ownership of components. 
 
Remote controllability of Distributed Energy 
Resources 
The Network Guidelines require remote controllability by 
DSO for all new generators and electricity storage that are 
of type B and above. In Central Europe, type B means all 
units that have at least 1 MW peak power. For other parts 
of Europe, the size of type B varies from country to 
country. In addition, it is necessary to define adequate 
requirements for the measurements and control dynamics 
(e.g. response duration, reliability and immunity to 
disturbances) of Distributed Energy Resources. The 
present situation in EU is such that voltage droops are not 
required, and the frequency droops requirement does not 
apply to electric energy storage nor electric vehicles. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions are twofold: on one hand the conducted 
CBAs support viability of coordination schemes, which 
have been suggested by SmartNet. The only exception is 
the Integrated flexibility market (CS_E), where the 
assessment could not be done due complexity and 
corresponding computational challenges. The present 
results further indicate that CS_B, CS_C and CS_D2 are 
more economically profitable than the remaining two 
schemes. However, CS_A has lower ICT costs and CS_C 
manages a large amount of energy due to the 
simplifications of the network model that is used in the 
clearing algorithm.  
 
On the second hand, the main impression is that hardly any 
of the present or proposed European regulation is 
explicitly in contrast to the hypotheses at the basis of the 
SmartNet work. However, for one topic, the EU legislation 
is somewhat different with configuration of SmartNet's 
coordination schemes. For incorporating bottlenecks into 
the pricing, SmartNet selected to use nodal market 
organisation for ancillary services, while several legal 
documents refer directly to zonal organisation as the model 
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for the electricity system in Europe.  
 
When it comes to the stakeholders' opinions, currently the 
situation is that ENTSO-E suggests that all congestion 
management needs, both for TSOs and DSOs, should be 
fulfilled by a common bid submission process from 
providers of distributed flexibility resources, so a common 
process will among other ensure liquidity of the market. 
 
The general conclusion from the screening study is that EU 
regulations are not directly addressing several of the topics 
identified by SmartNet, i.e. crucial topics for large-scale 
utilisation of Distributed Energy Resources in ancillary 
services, as for example timing of the markets. Without 
common EU regulations different solutions will develop in 
the distribution areas, the most diverse and non-
harmonized solutions will be implemented in agreement 
between DSOs and adjoining TSO (e.g. nation- or region-
wise under influence of TSO). This will not necessarily 
hamper the utilisation of local flexibility in the 
transmission grids, but it will certainly make more difficult 
the development towards cross-border utilisation of 
distributed energy resources. 
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